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Abstract. This paper surveys a selection of the literature on the private provision of public goods using the
Kolm triangle. (The Kolm triangle is the analogue of an Edgeworth box in an economy with a public good.)
We provide simple geometrical proofs of various established results using this graphical device. Our reference
framework is the model of private contributions to public goods developed by Bergstrom, Blume and Varian
(1986). With the Kolm triangle, we can easily study the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria, the effects
of redistribution of the initial income, the level of provision in Stackelberg equilibria, the effects of subsidizing
private contributions, and the implementation of Lindahl equilibria.
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1. Introduction
Private contributions to public goods are important phenomena for many reasons. In
the U.S. annual reported donations to charity amount to approximately 2% of its GDP.
In Kenya, the voluntary cooperation of members of the community is essential for the
provision of social infrastructure (Wilson 1992). Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986)
developed a model to study the private provision of public goods which applies to the
examples given above as well as to many other less obvious instances. Campaign funds
for political parties or interest groups also fall under the scope of this model. In addition,
much of the activity that takes place within the family unit can be explained as the out-
come of voluntary contributions, see Becker (1981), and Konrad and Lommerud (1995).
Kemp (1984), and Boadway, Pestieau and Wildasin (1989) have used this model to study
multilateral foreign aid issues. The provision of national defense in alliances can also
be studied within this model —see, e.g., Bruce (1990). More recently, Hoel (1991) and
Chichilinsky and Heal (1994) have used variants of this model to tackle global environ-
mental issues. See Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) —and references therein— for
further discussion on the relevance of this model.
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In this paper, we provide simple geometrical proofs to various results from the public-
goods literature using the Kolm triangle. The Kolm triangle is the analogue of the
Edgeworth box for an economy with two agents, one private good and one pure pub-
lic good. Malinvaud (1971) refers to unpublished ‘research papers’ by Serge-Christophe
Kolm, while the triangle managed to appear a bit earlier than Malinvaud’s paper in Ch. 9
(pp. 211–221) of Kolm’s text on public economics (Kolm 1970). Schlesinger (1989)
describes it in good detail and illustrates its use in analyzing Lindahl and Nash equilibria.
Despite its potential, the Kolm triangle hardly appears in the literature.1 Sullivan and
Schlesinger (1986) analyze the relationship between various canons of ‘just’ taxation
with the help of this graphical device. Groves and Ledyard (1987) use the triangle to
illustrate incentive-compatibility problems in an economy with public goods. More re-
cently, Chander (1993) uses the triangle to discuss dynamic procedures and incentives in
public-good economies. William Thomson uses this tool in various papers dealing with
allocation mechanisms (Thomson 1987), lecture notes (Thomson 1990), and concepts
of equity (Thomson 1993). Leamer (1987) uses a similar device to prove factor price
equalization in international trade. More surprising, perhaps, is the fact that the Kolm
triangle has not found its way in public economics textbooks. An exception is Laffont
(1988) who displays a few diagrams of the Kolm triangle, although he just barely refers
to them in the text.
The focus of this paper is merely expositional. Our reference framework will be the
model of private contributions to public goods used by Bergstrom, Blume and Varian
(1986), which we describe in section 2. With the Kolm triangle (introduced in section
3), we can easily study the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria (section 5), the
effects of redistribution of the initial income (subsection 5.1), the level of provision in
Stackelberg equilibria (section 6), the effects of subsidizing private contributions (section
7) and the implementation of Lindahl equilibria (section 8).
2. The Model
We have two agents, i =1 ;2, each of whom consumes one private good, xi, and one
shared public good, G. Agent i has a preference ordering over the pairs (xi;G) that can
be represented by a differentiable and strictly quasi-concave utility function, Ui(xi;G).
Both goods are assumed to be strictly normal goods. We shall assume that the public
good can be produced at a constant marginal cost. Choosing units suitably, we can make
the (constant) marginal rate of transformation between the private good and public good
equal to one. Finally, let (w1;w 2) be the agents’ initial endowments of private goods.
The agents choose their private contributions, gi, to the public good. The total amount
of public good provided is determined by the sum of the individual contributions, G =
1 A search made on the March 1993 EconLit CD (covering the Journal of Economic Literature since 1969)
for entries containing ‘Kolm’ and ‘triangle’ returned only Schlesinger (1989).Private Provision of Public Goods 3
g1 + g2. Each agent i solves
max
xi;gi
Ui(xi;g 1 + g2)
s.t. xi + gi = wi
xi;g i ¸ 0:
We can use the budget constraint to eliminate xi and write the individual’s optimization
problem more compactly as
max
gi
Ui(wi ¡ gi;g 1 + g2)
s.t. 0 · gi · wi:
(1)
A more general version of this model, with any number of agents, has been extensively
studied by Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986).
3. The Kolm Triangle
Figure 1 shows a Kolm triangle for our simple model economy. The height of the
(equilateral) triangle is given by the total amount of resources available, w1 + w2. Since,
in an equilateral triangle, the sum of the distances to the sides is constant and equals the
height of the triangle,2 then, for any point inside the triangle, we have
x1 + x2 + G = w1 + w2:
Therefore, any point inside the triangle is associated with a feasible allocation. In any
allocation, z, agent i’s private consumption is given by the distance from z to OiO0. The
amount of public good, G, associated with z is simply given by the distance from z to the
base of the triangle, O1O2.
Inﬁgure2werepresenttheagents’indifferencemaps. Westartfromagivenallocation,
z. To the right of the dashed line which is parallel to O1O0, agent one has more of the
private good than at z. Above the dashed line which is parallel to O1O2, agent one has
more of the public good than at z. It follows that any other allocation in the set B must be
better than z for agent one since in B she gets more of both goods than in z.I nW, on the
other hand, agent one gets less from both goods so she must be worse off. The direction
of the preferences is shown in ﬁgure 2. Agent i’s indifference curves are convex to his
origin, Oi, whenever his preferences are quasiconcave.3
SincealongO1O2 wehavethatG = 0,thenanypointalongO1O2 isassociatedwithan
2 AsimpleproofofthisfactbasedonThomson(1990)follows. LetS betheareaofthetriangleinﬁgure1, let
b denote the common length of the three sides, and h denote the height of the triangle. Note that S must equal
the sum of the areas of the three triangles O1zO2, O2zO0, and O0zO1, this implies that S = b(x1 +x2 +G)=2
or x1 + x2 + G =2 S=b, where the quantity on the right does not depend on the position of the point z. Since
S = bh=2 we must also have x1 + x2 + G = h ´ w1 + w2.
3 As noted in Schlesinger (1989) and Thomson (1990), the transformation from the Euclidean coordinates to
the barycentric coordinates in the Kolm triangle is linear. In particular, if (x1;g) are the Euclidean coordinates
associatedwithaconsumptionbundleforagent1, thenitscoordinatesinsidetheKolmtriangle(withO1 located

















Fig. 2. The indifference maps in a Kolm triangle.
initial allocation, w. Noting that the length of O1O2 is 2(w1 +w2)=
p
5, then the distance
of w from O1 will be given by 2w1=
p
5.
4. Other Geometrical Representations
Dolbear (1967) used an alternative geometrical device to study this type of economies.
The Dolbear triangle has been used, among others, by Shibata (1971) and Olsen (1979,
1981). Assuming a linear technology, the production possibilities set can be represented
by a triangle as depicted in ﬁgure 3.
Theamountofpublicgood, G, ismeasuredonthehorizontalaxisandthetotalamount
of private good on the vertical axis. Once a combination (G0;x 0) is chosen, all that
remainsistodividetheamountofprivategood, x0 betweenthetwoagents. Measuringx1
























Fig. 3. The Dolbear triangle.
Z represents a feasible allocation of x0 between the two agents. In ﬁgure 3, z represents
one such allocation with x0
1 consumed by agent one and x0
2 by agent two; feasibility is
satisﬁed since we have x0
1 + x0
2 = x0 and x0 + G0 = w. Agent one’s indifference map on
this triangle will have the usual representation while agent two’s is harder to visualize.
In ﬁgure 3, given an allocation, z, agent two will have less of both goods in region W
and more of both goods in region B. The convexity assumption requires his indifference
curves to be convex to O2.
CornesandSandler(1985,1986)chooseyetanotherrepresentation,nowontheg1¡g2
plane. We show it on ﬁgure 4. At z, G0 = g0
1 +g0
2 is provided. The dashed line through z
with slope ¡1 represents the allocations where g1 + g2 = G0. In the region B, above the
g1+g2 = G0 line and to the left of g0
1, agent one gets more of both goods and is, therefore,
better than in z. Conversely, in region W, below the g1 + g2 = G0 line and to the right of
g0
1, she is worse off than in z. Representative indifference curves are shown in ﬁgure 4.
As discussed in Schlesinger (1989), an advantage that the Dolbear triangle and the
Cornes-Sandler box share is that they use the familiar Euclidean coordinates unlike the
Kolm triangle which uses barycentric coordinates. The Dolbear and Cornes-Sandler
representations can be easily extended to more general technologies which cannot be
done with the Kolm triangle. The Dolbear triangle is somewhat more difﬁcult to read
since the agents are not treated symmetrically. (The Cornes-Sandler box omits G from
the graph although in the case of linear technology it can be easily recovered —e.g.,b y
drawing the line g1 + g2 through any allocation.) We shall only use the Kolm triangle
in the remaining of the paper. Nevertheless, all the geometrical proofs that follow can
be (although sometimes more difﬁculty) reproduced using Dolbear’s triangle and the
Cornes-Sandler box.4



















Fig. 4. The Cornes-Sandler box.
5. Nash Equilibrium
A Nash equilibrium in this model is a vector of contributions (g¤
1;g¤
2) which solves the
two agents’ following optimization programs:
max U1(w1 ¡ g1;g 1 + g¤
2) and max U2(w2 ¡ g2;g¤
1 + g2)
s.t. 0 · g1 · w1 s.t. 0 · g2 · w2:
Figure 5 shows a Nash equilibrium, denoted by E. Let A =( w1;w 2) represent the
initial allocation. When g2 = 0, agent one’s opportunity locus is given by the segment
AC which is parallel to O2O0 —i.e., along AC we have that x2 = w2. When agent
two is contributing g¤
2 = A0J, agent one’s opportunity locus shifts to A0C0. The Nash
equilibrium, E, is agent one’s optimal choice on her budget line A0C0. She contributes
g¤
1 = A00I and consumes EH = w1¡g¤
1 of the private good. When agent one contributes
g¤
1, agent two’s opportunity locus shifts from AB (where g1 =0 )t oA00B00. (Note that
AB and A00B00 are parallel to O1O0.) On A00B00, agent two’s most preferred point is E,
where he contributes g¤
2. Since the agents’ indifference curves cross through E, the Nash
equilibriumisnotParetooptimal. (Withdifferentiablepreferences,aParetooptimalNash
equilibrium is a possibility only at the endowment point, A.)
Let us denote by g1(g2) and g2(g1) agent one’s and agent two’s optimal solutions
to (1) as functions of the other agent’s gift. Thus, g1(g2) and g2(g1) are the agents’
reaction functions. Then, if (g¤
1;g¤






We can represent agent one’s reaction function in a Kolm triangle, see ﬁgure 6. Again,
let A =( w1;w 2) represent the initial allocation. When g2 = 0, agent one’s opportunity
locus is given by the segment AC. Given this constraint, agent one would choose to
contribute g1(0). When g2 = g0, the opportunity locus will shift to A0C0, and agent one
will choose g1(g0) for a total amount of G given by g1(g0)+g0. When g2 ¸ g00,w eh a v e
























Fig. 6. Agent one’s reaction function.
If both goods are normal goods, the reaction function g1(g2) cannot be steeper than
O1O0 (since that would imply a smaller demand of x1 as income increases) and it cannot
beﬂatterthanO1O2 (sincethatwouldimplyasmallerdemandofGasincomeincreases).
As a result, once agent one’s reaction function hits AB it has to stay on AB since AB
is parallel to O1O0 —of course, the reaction function g1(g2) doesn’t need to ever hit
AB. Said another way, once agent one contributes nothing to the public good, bigger
contributions by agent two will only induce agent one to keep contributing nothing. The
curve DB in ﬁgure 6 represents agent one’s reaction function. (A similar derivation for
agent two will tell us that g2(g1) has to be ﬂatter than O2O0 and steeper than O1O2.)
Givenaninitialdistributionofincome, wecanplotg1(g2)andg2(g1). Theexistenceof
Nash equilibrium (theorem 2 in Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986)) will be established
if we can show that the graphs of the reaction functions cross inside the triangle. Refer8 E. Ley
to ﬁgure 7. We have that g1(g2) must start out somewhere on AC and must reach the
segment BO0. Agent two’s reaction function, g2(g1), must go from AB to CO0. Both
reaction functions must always stay inside the romboid ACO0B, and by the assumptions
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g1(g2)
Fig. 7. Existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 3 in Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) says that: “there is a unique
Nash equilibrium with a unique quantity of public good and a unique set of contributing
consumers.” Heretheuniquenessfollowsfromtheboundsimposedbythestrictnormality
assumption (Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986), page 32) on the slope of the reaction
functions. The ﬁrst panel in ﬁgure 7 shows a unique Nash equilibrium. The second panel
gives an example of multiple equilibria when G is an inferior good.
5.1. Neutral Income Redistributions
Warr (1983) discovered an interesting neutrality theorem that was later extended by
Bergstrom, BlumeandVarian(1986), andGradstein, NitzanandSlutsky(1994). Assume
that we have a Nash equilibrium, (g¤
1;g¤
2). If income is redistributed among contributing
consumers in such a way that none of them loses more income than his original contri-
bution, then there is a new Nash equilibrium, (g¤¤
1 ;g¤¤







i = wi ¡g¤
i . That is, the same amount of public good is provided and each agent
consumes the same amount of private goods that in the original equilibrium —i.e., every
consumer changes the amount of his gift by precisely the amount of the income transfer.
Figure8showstheeffectofaredistributionofincomefromagentonetoagenttwothat
shifts the initial point from A to A0. The diagram shows the agents’ reaction functions
whose intersection determines the Nash equilibrium E. The portion of g1(g2) between
AC and A0C0 is no longer relevant after the redistribution. On the other hand, agent
two’s reaction function, g2(g1), gains an additional portion between AB and A0B0 after





















Fig. 9. Bounds on the income redistribution.
game. The agents’ consumptions remain unchanged.
Figure 9 shows the bounds on income redistribution. In A0 we have taken away from
agent two an amount of income equal to his gift in the initial Nash equilibrium. This is
the maximum amount that we can take away from him and still get the same equilibrium
level of public good and private consumptions. The maximum redistribution from agent
onetoagenttwo—thatwillleavetheequilibriumamountof Gand(x1;x 2)unchanged—
will move the endowment to A00.
5.2. Inequality and Social Welfare
While the Warr neutrality result establishes that a whole range of initial distributions of
income are mapped into the same ﬁnal allocation, Itaya, Meza and Myles (1997, IMM
henceforth) establish the remarkable result that social welfare can be raised by creating
sufﬁcient income inequality so that only the rich can afford to provide the public good.
IMM show that, starting from the limit of allowable Warr-type redistributions, increasing10 E. Ley
inequalitycanbewelfare-enhancing—asprivateconsumptionbyoneagentissubstituted
by a mix of private consumption by the other agent and public-good provision.
Take two individuals with identical preferences, Ui = U(¢), and consider the tradeoff
between agents’ utilities along the different Nash equilibria obtained by redistributing
income. As in IMM, let us redistribute income from agent 2 to agent 1, so that agent 2
has just enough income to afford the same private consumption, x¤
2, that he had at any
of the interior Nash equilibria (i.e., we make w2 = x¤
2). Now, at the associated Nash
equilibrium, agent 2 is contributing nothing to the public good, g¤
2 = 0. Let us denote
this initial allocation by A. Theorem 3 in IMM establishes that, starting at A, a further
(small) redistribution from agent 2 (poorer) to agent 1 (richer) will always be welfare
enhancing.5
Considertheslopeofthegraphrelatingtheagents’utilitiesassociatedwiththedifferent
equilibria that are obtained through redistribution of the initial incomes (Figure 10). We
shall denote the absolute value of the slope of this graph by N. Using the symmetry
assumption and the fact that A leads to an interior Nash equilibrium (which implies that


























Theassumptionthatbothgoodsarenormalmeansthat0 <@ g 1(t)=@t < 1,which,inturn,
bounds the slope of the graph: 0 < N(0+) < 1 (where 0+ indicates a right derivative,
as t # 0). What about dt < 0— i.e., transfers from 2 to 1? The Warr neutrality result
implies that nothing happens until we place agent 2 in his corner solution. From there
on, given the symmetry assumption, everything works out as above only with subscripts
reversed, and we have that: N(0¡) > 1.
Let W(U1;U 2) be a symmetric and differentiable social welfare function. The (abso-




@U2. Since at the Nash equilibrium the utility levels are equalized (Theorem 1
in IMM), and using the symmetry assumption on W(¢), we must have that W(0+)=
W(0¡)=1 .
Starting at A, a small movement to the right (i.e., dt > 0) will result in an equilibrium
allocation that is associated with a higher social indifference curve because N(0+) <
W(0+). Similarly, since we have N(0¡) > W(0¡), small movements to the left (from
the corresponding initial allocation where agent 2 is just in his corner solution) will also
increase welfare.
Figure 10 shows the utility possibility frontier associated with the Nash equilibria that
result from different initial distributions of income, when the agents have Cobb-Douglas
5 This result holds as long as the utility function at the individual level is not Leontieff and the social welfare
function is not Rawlasian (i.e., W = minfU1;U 2g). In either of these two cases, this type of regressive
redistribution will always lower social welfare.Private Provision of Public Goods 11
U1
Cobb-Douglas (a = 0.75) U2
A
U1
Leontieff: No possible welfare improvement. U2
A
U1
Cobb-Douglas (a = 0.25) U2
A
U1
Cobb-Douglas (a = 0.5) U2
A
Fig. 10. Utility possibility frontier associated with the Nash equilibria
resulting from different initial distributions of income.
preferencesgivenby: Ui = xa
i G(1¡a).6 Thescopeofregressiveredistributiontoenhance
social welfare depends on (i) the individual preferences, and (ii) the shape of the social
indifference curves. Figure 10 illustrates the effect of (i): the larger the taste for G (the
smaller a), the larger the scope for redistribution to enhance welfare. When there is
no substitution possible among goods (i.e., preferences are of the Leontieff type at the
individual level), then any redistribution will lower social welfare.
We do not show any social indifference curves in Figure 10, but the reader can easily
imagine them to see the effects of (ii). At one extreme, a utilitarian welfare function,
W = U1 + U2, would have social indifference curves that are lines with W(t) = 1, for all
t, offering the largest scope for regressive redistribution to increase welfare. At the other
extreme, a Rawlsian welfare function, W = minfU1;U 2g, would have Leontieff-type
social indifference curves and any redistribution would always lower social welfare.
6 Figure10plotsthegraphgivenbythepairsofindirect utilities(V1(t);V 2(t))atthecorrespondingequilibria.
For dt > 0, ﬁrst place agent 1 at her corner solution A, by making w1 = a=(1 ¡ a) ´ ®. Then, since g2(t)=
(1¡a)(1¡®+t), we have that V1(t)=( ®¡t)a[(1¡a)(1¡®+t)]1¡a, and V2(t)=( 1¡®+t)aa(1¡a)1¡a.12 E. Ley
6. Stackelberg Equilibrium
Varian (1994) studies sequential contributions to public goods. The Kolm triangle is a
useful tool to gain further insights into his results. Let agent one be the leader and agent
two be the follower. Then, the Stackelberg equilibrium will be determined by agent one




U1(w1 ¡ g1;g 1 + g2(g1))
s.t. 0 · g1 · w1
where g2(g1) is agent two’s reaction function —i.e., the solution to (1) for agent two.
Varian (1994)’s main result (theorem 2) states that the leader’s contribution at the
Stackelberg equilibrium is bounded above by her contribution at the Nash equilibrium.
As a corollary, the total amount of the public good in the Stackelberg equilibrium is never












Fig. 11. Stackelberg equilibrium: Agent one is leader.
Figure 11 shows Nash and Stackelberg equilibria. The Nash equilibrium, E, is de-
termined by the crossing of the reaction functions. The Stackelberg equilibrium, F,i s
given by agent one’s most preferred point in agent two’s reaction function. We have
drawn agent one’s indifference curves through those equilibria. Looking at the indiffer-
ence curve through E, we see that agent one will move to points of g2(g1) to the right
of E. Since g2(g1) has a negative slope, this movement necessarily implies less G in
the Stackelberg equilibrium (Varian (1994), corollary to theorem 3). We can also easily
see why agent one’s contribution at the Stackelberg equilibrium can be no larger than her
contribution at the Nash equilibrium. Since the Stackelberg equilibrium cannot lie to the
left of the Nash equilibrium, it implies that agent one’s contribution will be smaller. In
ﬁgure 11, agent one contributes g¤
1 = DI at the Nash equilibrium and gs
1 = JH at the
Stackelberg equilibrium.Private Provision of Public Goods 13
From ﬁgure 11 it can also be concluded that the follower’s contribution at the Stack-
elberg equilibrium is bounded below by his contribution at the Nash equilibrium. This
result is not in Varian (1994). However, once it is noticed, it can be easily proved with
the analytical apparatus developed there.
7. Subsidizing Contributions
Back in a Nash model, Roberts (1987) discovered the puzzling result that rich people
might be made worse off when their contributions are subsidized at a higher rate than
poor people —e.g., when the contributions are tax-deductible in a system of progressive
income taxation. This issue has been examined by Bergstrom (1989) who shows that if
we have two identical individuals contributing to a public good, each will prefer to face a
pricehigherthanthepricefacedbytheotherindividual. InRoberts(1987)andBergstrom
(1989) the subsidy is paid by a lump-sum tax on both agents. Varian (1994) shows that
each agent will prefer to subsidize the other agent even if he must pay the entire amount
of the subsidy himself. In Varian’s model, agents have quasi-linear utility functions.
Boadway, Pestieau and Wildasin (1989) show (theorem 2) that for two non-identical
individuals with general quasi-concave utility functions, when both goods are normal, an
agent will always want to subsidize the other agent’s contributions even if he must pay
the entire amount of the subsidy himself. We only analyze here the case where we have
interior Nash equilibria before the subsidy.




U2(w2 ¡ (1 ¡ s)g2;g 1 + g2)
s.t. 0 · (1 ¡ s)g2 · w2;
(2)
and agent one’s problem is
max
g1
U2(w1 ¡ sg2 ¡ g1;g 1 + g2)
s.t. 0 · g1 · w1 ¡ sg2:
(3)
Given the subsidy rate, s, a Nash equilibrium is a vector of contributions (g¤
1(s);g¤
2(s))
which solves both (2) and (3).
Theorem2inBoadway,PestieauandWildasin(1989)establishesthat—providedthat
both agents are contributing at the initial Nash equilibrium where s = 0— there always
exists a subsidy rate, s, such that agent one —who pays the subsidy— is better off at the









Further, agent two —who is being subsidized— is worse off than before the subsidy, i.e.,
U2(w2 ¡ (1 ¡ s)g¤
2(s);g¤
1(s)+g¤














Fig. 12. The Geometry of a Subsidy.
Figure 12 shows the geometry of a subsidy. The subsidy changes the slope of agent two’s
opportunity loci. In particular, if ® measures the angle, in radians, of AB0 with respect to
O1O2, thens = sin(®¡¼=3)=sin®. When® = ¼=3sothatAB0 isparalleltoO1O0, then
s = 0. At the other extreme, when ® =2 ¼=3 so that AB0 is parallel to O2O0 then s =1 .
Since agent one has to pay for the subsidy, her opportunity loci will be also affected. In
ﬁgure 12, when g2 = A0D, agent one has to pay T = sg2 = A0D ¡ FH. This shifts her








Fig. 13. Agent one subsidizes agent two.
Figure 13 shows the effects of a subsidy from agent one to agent two. We display the
initial Nash equilibrium, E, where the agents’ reaction functions cross. We have also
represented the agents’ indifference curves through E. When agent one subsidizes agent
two, agent two’s new reaction function has to be above his old reaction function. At the
new equilibrium, F, agent one is clearly better off than at E. What about agent two?Private Provision of Public Goods 15
Since the slope of agent two’s indifference curve through E is parallel to O1O0 which is
the upper bound for the slope of agent one’s reaction function, g1(g2), it follows that F
must lie below agent two’s indifference curve through E.
To better understand the importance of this result, let us consider a movement from
the original Nash equilibrium E.A tE, agent one’s marginal rate of substitution between
the private and public goods equals the marginal rate of transformation, 1. Suppose
that by offering to match any further contributions that agent two might do, agent one
gets agent two to increase his contribution by g2. Agent one would then be effectively
‘purchasing’ g2 at half price! Moreover, provided that the g2 is not too big, both agents
would improve their situations after this deal.7 Boadway, Pestieau and Wildasin (1989)’s
theoremdiscussedabovetellsussomethingabitdifferentsincewearenotmovingfroma
no-subsidy Nash equilibrium but from the initial endowment point. The surprising result
is that agent one is going to be willing to subsidize agent two’s contribution from his very
ﬁrst unit, and that agent two is going to be made worse off by this scheme.
A word on corner solutions. If agent two was not contributing towards the public good
at the initial Nash equilibrium, the same results hold provided that there is a subsidy that
induces him to contribute a positive amount. The other corner solution, where agent one
was not contributing initially, can lead to anything. It may or may not be possible to
improve agent one’s welfare with the subsidy; and, in either case, agent two might end
up better or worse off.
8. Lindahl Equilibria
Suppose that we allow for personalized prices for the public good, agent i facing pi, with
p2 ´ 1 ¡ p1 and p1 2 [0;1]. Given a pair of prices, we can have the agents choosing




s.t. wi ¡ piG ¸ 0
(4)
Whenever, for some p¤
1, the desired demands for G by each agent are equal then we have
a Lindahl equilibrium. Since the Lindahl prices split the Kolm triangle into two separate
budget sets which are disjoint except for their common boundary, it follows that Lindahl
equilibria are Pareto optimal. The assumptions made on the preferences do not guarantee
the existence of Lindahl equilibria. However, these assumptions guarantee that they will
be unique if they exist —i.e., there will be at most one Lindahl equilibrium associated




1G¤;w 2 ¡ p¤
2G¤;G¤)i saLindahl equilibrium if G¤
solves problem (4) for i =1 ;2, when we replace pi by p¤
i. In a Lindahl equilibrium,
the agents face personalized prices for the public good while they all consume the same
7 If agent two increases his contribution by too much, it is possible that agent one might end up worse off. Of







Fig. 14. Lindahl Equilibrium.
amount —in contrast with a private-goods economy Walrasian equilibrium where the
agents have individual demands facing all the agents same prices. We shall deﬁne an
allocation (¯ x1; ¯ x2; ¯ G)t ob eaLindahl allocation if there exist prices, (¯ p1; ¯ p2) such that
(¯ p1; ¯ p2;w1 ¡ ¯ p1 ¯ G;w2 ¡ ¯ p2 ¯ G; ¯ G) is a Lindahl equilibrium.
Personalized prices can be obtained by allowing each agent to subsidize the other
agents’ contributions as in section 7. What is the outcome of the two-stage game where
each agent announces ﬁrst a subsidy rate for the other agent and then, in a second stage,
chooses his own contribution? This game is studied in Danziger and Schnytzer (1991)8
and they ﬁnd that all the subgame-perfect equilibria of this game are Lindahl allocations.
The two-stage game consists of:
Stage 1. Agent i chooses sj for j 6=1 .
Stage 2. Each agent chooses gi ¸ 0. If (1 ¡ si)gi + sjgj >w i; any rule that allocates
the entire agent i’s endowment to the public good will sufﬁce.9




2(s1;s 2)) such that:
(i) (g¤
1(ˆ s1; ˆ s2);g¤
2(ˆ s1; ˆ s2)) is a Nash equilibrium of the second-stage game given (ˆ s1; ˆ s2);
i.e., g¤
i (ˆ s1; ˆ s2)) solves
Ái(ˆ si; ˆ sj) ´ max
gi
Ui(wi ¡ (1 ¡ ˆ si)gi ¡ ˆ sjg¤
j;g i + g¤
j)
s.t. 0 · (1 ¡ ˆ si)gi · wi ¡ ˆ sjg¤
j for j 6= i;
8 Varian (1994) studied a related game where the rate at which each agent subsidizes the other agents is set
by the other agents.
9 Here, if sj > 0, agent i’s choice set for gi depends on the other agent choice of gj. We can, for example,
make gi =( wi ¡ sigi)=(1¡ si) whenever wi >s igi; otherwise make sj = wi=gj and gi = 0. See Danziger




j) ¸ Ái(si;s ¤
j), for all si, i;j =1 ;2;i 6= j.

















Fig. 15. Pareto Efﬁcient Equilibria with s1 + s2 6=1 .
Left: s1 + s2 > 1; G =0 .Right: s1 + s2 < 1; Agent 1 contributes 0.
The only possible equilibrium when s1 +s2 > 1 is at the initial allocation where both
agents are contributing nothing towards the public good. This equilibrium is always a
Pareto efﬁcient allocation, provided that it exists —and there is a whole range of Lindahl
prices that will support it as a Lindahl equilibrium. We illustrate one such case in the left
panel of ﬁgure 15. Of course, it is possible that no equilibrium exists at all if s1 +s2 > 1.
Ifs1+s2 < 1wecanpossiblyhaveaParetoefﬁcientSPE,whichwillalsobeaLindahl
allocation, only when gi = 0 for one of the agents. Note that in the simple contributions
game of section 5 we could not possibly have a Pareto efﬁcient NE with one of the agents
contributing a positive amount. We illustrate such a possibility in the right panel of ﬁgure
15. What allows for this possibility now is that AB0 is steeper than AB which itself
bounds the slope of agent one’s indifference curves (see ﬁgure 2).
Bytheresultsinsection7wecannothaveaninteriorSPEwhenevers1+s2 < 1. Every
equilibrium in the second-stage game which is not a Pareto efﬁcient allocation cannot
be a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the two-stage game. Figure 16 shows a general
interior equilibrium of the second-stage game. Any agent can improve her welfare by
incrementing the subsidy to the other agent.




2(s1;s 2)), as the one depicted in
ﬁgure 14, with s¤
1 + s¤
2 = 1. What would be the effect of agent two reducing agent one’s
subsidy to ˜ s1 <s ¤
1? We show this in ﬁgure 17. At the SPE E, with s¤
1 + s¤
2 =1 ,
10 Note that our deﬁnition of a Lindahl allocation differs from Danziger and Schnytzer (1991) since they do











Fig. 16. Inefﬁcient Second-Stage Game Equilibrium.
both agents are facing the common budget line AB0. Now, when s1 falls to ˜ s1 <s ¤
1,
agent one’s budget line becomes AC0 when agent two contributes nothing. When agent
two contributes positive amounts towards the public good, agent one’s budget line slides
paralell to AC0 from AB0 to O1O0. The strict normality of both goods will guarantee
that agent one’s reaction function hits AB0 below E; also, as before, once it hits AB0 it









2) and agent one contributing zero,
g¤
1(˜ s1;s ¤
2) = 0. This illustrates that a given Lindahl allocation can be supported by a














In this paper we provide simple geometrical proofs to a number of established results
using the Kolm triangle. The Kolm triangle shows to be a powerful tool to understand
the intricacies of the model and it is especially useful as a pedagogic device. The results
shown in this paper were originally established using algebraic proofs, and hold in more
general scenarios than the linear 2-agent 2-good world used here.
Alltheresultsdiscussedinthispaper(exceptthoseinsection6dealingwithsequential
provision) generalize to n agents. The other simplifying assumption, common linear
technology, is harder to relax in some cases —specially the ‘common’ part. All the
resultsholdwhenthepublicgoodisobtainedbyasinglewell-behavedproductionprocess,
G = f(g1 + g2), with f0(¢) > 0 and f00(¢) · 0. However, endowing each participant with




of the household where income transfers from the domestic partner who has comparative
advantage outside the home to the other turn out to be not only efﬁciency-enhancing but
also Pareto improving). Finally, the Warr neutrality result can also be extended to the
case of many public goods (Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986), section 6).
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